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Abstract 
Meyer Howard Abrams described a paradigm which implicitly underlies most 
of the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of art; the artwork is the core of the scheme: an 
artwork-centered structure, in which any other element (artist, audience, universe) 
is analysed as an exclusive connection to it. This way, the paradigm can undergo 
modification without defacing the structure. The ‘60s were the stage of a gentle 
revolution in art-practice and Mandelbaum’s, Danto’s and Dickie’s suggestions 
add a further tag in the scheme: the context. This paradigm works accordingly 
within a compartmentalisation that does not take into account the evolution of 
contemporary art. Working from a bottom-up perspective, some anomalies are 
highlighted, requiring a new lens (or paradigm) to develop proper theoretical tools 
in philosophy of art.
Keywords: Meyer Howard Abrams, Paradigm, Philosophy of Art, Ontology of Art, 
Contemporary Art, Decentralisation, Art Market
Abrams’ paradigm 
Meyer Howard Abrams was a lean and elegant man. He used to smoke a tobacco 
pipe, hung sideways from his lips. As a man of another age, he gave us a practical 
conceptual scheme – a kind of orientation among critical theories and statements 
on philosophy of art. While Ivor Armstrong Richard (1924) was drowning in 
contradictory and conflicting philosophies of art - since he couldn’t establish any 
guidelines - Abrams developed a useful compass to find orientation in an area where 
others got lost. 
According to Thomas Kuhn, scientific research has a cyclical pattern: scientists 
write down a paradigm (a conceptual scheme) around which further researches 
clot. A paradigm directs explorations, it is logically economical – summing up 
scientific observations in a comprehensive grid – and psychologically familiar since 
it draws borders thereby building a close and easily investigable world. Moreover, as 
a lighthouse, it fosters analysis: no studies exist outside the paradigm itself. In other 
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words, paradigms “provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions 
of scientific research” (Kuhn, 1962, p.10) – in other words, “normal science”. 
Nevertheless, puzzling problems can arise; sometimes they are solved with minor 
adjustments to the paradigm-nature and in other cases, they could be delayed. Yet, 
there are cases where anomalies turn into sources of crisis which become widely 
recognised by some of the field-professionals. The paradigm loses its power, it gets 
weaker and scientists start developing new examples of actual scientific practice 
thereby developing a new paradigm. 
As a field of scientific research, philosophy of art is somewhat different. Abrams 
outlines an actual paradigm – “a frame of reference simple enough to be readily 
manageable, yet flexible enough” (Abrams, 1953, .5). Four elements emerge in all 
theories: the work of art, the artist, the audience and the universe; and, as props, 
these coordinates define the conceptual scheme. Each theory is concerned with 
outlining a precise theoretical proposal by highlighting two overriding elements – 
one of which is always the artwork. Four main directions emerge as a result: mimetic 
theories, expressive theories, pragmatic theories and objective theories. Each 
resultant theory is concerned with defining particular borders for each prop, since 
each element has pliable semantic boundaries. 
“X is an artwork only if it is an imitation” (Carroll, 1999, p.21). The motto of 
mimetic theorists holds that artworks are nothing but imitations, emphasising 
the relation between artwork and universe. It is the most enduring approach, 
becoming a sort of theoretical myth – endorsed by several authors, Batteaux (1746) 
and Lessing (1836) among others. Goodman’s account (1969) – on the difference 
between representation and imitation – allows for an extension: “x is an artwork 
only if x has a subject about which it makes some comment” (Carroll, 1999, p.26). It 
is reminiscent of Danto’s aboutness (Danto, 1981) and allows the addressing of neo-
representationalists from the same perspective. 
Expressive theories (artwork-artist) focus on the internal and emotive life of 
the artist as a starting point for speculation. Artworks are soliloquies and artists 
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Expressive theories (artwork-artist) focus on the internal and emotive life of the artist as 
a starting point for speculation. Artworks are soliloquies and artists are scientists since, 
“engaged in expressing emotions” (Hospers, 1956, p.293), they select highly 
individualised states of feeling and clarify them by means of lines, shapes and colors. 
According to Langer (1957), an artwork expresses “its creator‟s idea of immediate, felt, 
emotive life” (p.8). Croce-Collingwood‟s theory fits into this set as Kemp (2013) states 
that “art is expression that we engage with via the intuitive capacity”.   
 
Pragmatic theories insist on artworks-audience biunivocal relations: the former‟s 
purpose is “to achieve certain effects in an audience” (Abrams, 1953, p.14). They recall 
Horace‟s delectare et movere, expand in rhetoric compendia and spread through Hurd‟s 
and Johnson‟s pages – “the end of poetry is to instruct by pleasing” (Raleigh, 1908, 
p.16). On the other hand, artworks might also possess “the capacity of affording 
aesthetic experience” (Carroll, 1999, p.162). As an example, Jerome Stolnitz (1960) and 
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are scientists since, “engaged in expressing emotions” (Hospers, 1956, p.293), they 
select highly individualised states of feeling and clarify them by means of lines, 
shapes and colors. According to Langer (1957), an artwork expresses “its creator’s 
idea of immediate, felt, emotive life” (p.8). Croce-Collingwood’s theory fits into 
this set as Kemp (2013) states that “art is expression that we engage with via the 
intuitive capacity”.  
Pragmatic theories insist on artworks-audience biunivocal relations: the former’s 
purpose is “to achieve certain effects in an audience” (Abrams, 1953, p.14). They 
recall Horace’s delectare et movere, expand in rhetoric compendia and spread 
through Hurd’s and Johnson’s pages – “the end of poetry is to instruct by pleasing” 
(Raleigh, 1908, p.16). On the other hand, artworks might also possess “the capacity 
of affording aesthetic experience” (Carroll, 1999, p.162). As an example, Jerome 
Stolnitz (1960) and Edward Bullough (1973), regardless of how divergent their 
arguments may be1, unveil a common ground: the ontological attribution relies on 
audience reactions while looking at discreet objects.
Finally, objective theories identify artworks as self-sufficient entities, 
characterised by internal relations that establish their own criteria. Art is neither 
a mirror nor a reflection: art for art’s sake declares its autonomy. As Carroll (1999, 
p.115) concludes, “X is a work of art if and only if x is designed primarily in order to 
possess and to exhibit significant form”. 
We are reassured of the implicit presence of the paradigm that covers a quite 
broad timeframe and is utterly evident in the analytical tradition. Abrams’ outspoken 
admission is comparable to Carroll’s overview (1999): their historical surveys 
are placed at the limits of a straddle between essentialist and non-essentialist 
traditions. Abrams sums up the long pathway that leads to this divergence, while 
Carroll’s summary is a working-tool for the understanding of the last forty years 
of the previous century. Ultimately, Carroll supports Abrams’ paradigm’s implicit 
presence, despite the aforementioned straddle.
A contemporary Aristotelian could advance a counter-argument since the 
Aristotlean aesthetic is not just an example of a mimetic approach. Even if Aristotle’s 
account is usually mentioned under the heading of mimetic theories, his aesthetic 
shows pragmatic and objective approaches as catharsis is an emotional education. 
In other words, it seems as though the idea of a hierarchical preponderance of a 
couple of elements is reductive. I am not suggesting that centuries of reflections 
on art have fought the complexity of art phenomena with unequal weapons and 
neither is Abrams doing so. However, each theory has a starting point. Take the case 
1 Stolnitz and Bullough propose affected-oriented accounts – insisting on peculiar kinds of 
actions or attitudes. The former proposes a common action (contemplation) realised with 
specific skills – “disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any 
object of awareness whatever, for its own sake” (Stolnitz, 1960, p. 34-35), while the latter 
defines a sui generis action, since the artwork has to be “distanced”from our “practical 
needs and ends” (Saxena, 1978, p.81).
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of Aristotle: the tragic work is “analysed formally as a self-determining whole made 
up of parts, all organised around the controlling part: the tragic plot” (Abrams, 1953, 
p.27). Tragedy is therefore recognised in its autonomy. Nevertheless, such a result is 
made possible by a mimetic approach: verisimilitude permits further pragmatic or 
objective considerations. 
To sum up, Abrams’ paradigm follows two dogmas – with few exceptions. On 
the one hand, a biunivocal relation grounds any possible philosophical reflection 
on art: a couple of elements sets its theoretical and explanatory power among the 
others, while the remaining elements are understood as ancillaries – understood 
following the aforementioned couple. On the other hand, the artwork is placed at 
the center. It is the starting and ending point of a circularly built analytical structure 
which creates a pyramidal picture: the artwork, as a mysterious chamber of secrets, 
becomes the theoretical target which is the only concern the philosopher keeps in 
mind in approaching art phenomena. The explanandum and the explanans collapse, 
the pathway itself becomes the destination.  
A gentle revolution: the artworld
Carl Andre’s humble tiles, Dan Flavin’s fluorescent neon lights, Lawrence Weiner’s 
Xerox copies and all the things that Robert Barry knows: a revolutionary tide 
sweeping away previous preconceptions. During the ‘60s, artworks transformed 
their very ontological status. Artists claimed an expanded field, as if the work of art 
itself would not stand alone, requiring the presence of some sort of context as a 
source of validity. 
During the ’60s, the limen that separated life from art got thinner, resulting in a 
final overlapping of the two thereby collapsing any differentia (Danto, 1986, 1996). 
Yvonne Rainer’s Room Service is an example in which dancers carry a mattress 
around the ballroom and move from the stage to the emergency exits and back 
again. It is indiscernible to professional movers’ actions and only the context – as a 
fictional marker – can help us. It sounds Wittgensteinian: the meaning is nothing but 
the use (Wittgenstein, 1953). Minimalism offers two interpretations. Firstly, meaning 
undergoes continuous modifications – the context determines the explanation of 
the artwork itself. Secondly, meanings arise in spaces of mutual exchange2; hence, 
the autonomy of authors’ intention is rejected. Untitled (L-beams) (1965) by Robert 
Morris supports this point. Three indistinguishable modules are installed with 
different orientations, so that the visitor cannot perceive them as identical, proving 
that space modifies shapes. Visitors’ moving eyes and bodies construe and reorient 
spaces – these are the early signs of Rosalind Krauss’ “expanded field” (1981). 
2 The Death of the Author (1967) by Roland Barthes – corroborates such interpretations. 
The intention of the author cannot guarantee meanings and purposes of artworks. Mean-
ings emerge from a mutual interchange between audience’s members.  
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Moreover, Duchamp’s ‘ready-mades’ are understood in their performative and 
linguistic power. If selection is creation (Groys, 2005), an artwork requires nothing 
but a declaration – a linguistic act composed against a background that validates it. 
As Hal Foster (2004) highlights, artists undertake common strategies to eliminate 
any ontological or intrinsic definition of their artworks.
To sum up, meaning as use suggests the presence of a framework that 
warrants art’s vocabulary. George Dickie (1962), Arthur Danto (1964) and Maurice 
Mandelbaum (1965) develop similar instances in philosophy creating a gentle 
revolution. Dickie (1962) argues, against pragmatic theories, that psychic distance 
or aesthetic attitude cannot help in perceiving artworks. Instead, picture frames, 
raised devices and the like serve “merely as a signal (if any is needed) that certain 
rules are to be obeyed” (p.299). If there are rules, there is an institution that handles 
them – or at least a context that handed them down. Danto’s (1964) renowned 
article – The Artworld – talks about artistic theories and knowledge of the history 
of art as keys (or paradigms, see Jones, 2000) for the understanding of specific 
activities. Therefore, without any theories, one will never get the chance to see art 
– ironically, just a few years later, Tom Wolfe (1975) wrote that “believing is seeing” 
(p.4). Danto (1964) recalls “something the eye cannot decry” (p.580) as a necessary 
condition for the existence of art phenomena. Finally, Mandelbaum (1965) criticises 
Wittgensteinian’s anti-essentialist approach on art, invalidating family resemblance 
accounts which rest on genetic properties, meaning that they are just generic 
resemblances. Thereby, Mandelbaum suggests that a common ancestor is required 
– to be found in the right place, “without assuming that any [common] feature 
[...] must be some manifest characteristic” (p.222). Such a feature could insist on 
relational properties – again, a reference to a validating framework. 
Abrams’ paradigm (1953) does not accommodate such instances and it seems 
that something is missing. Such philosophers record an anomaly, without questioning 
the validity of the paradigm. Instead, they propose minor adjustments, leaving the 
scheme’s functioning unchanged. 
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Institutional theories – or rather, contextual theories – insist on the relation between 
artworks and a status-validating framework, the “context”. So what does context 
specify? My proposal follows from Dickie‟s (1969) and Danto‟s (1964, 1992) 
suggestions3 and recalls Carroll‟s (1994) narrative theory and Levinson‟s (1979) 
historical oriented account. The context comprises a sociological dimension – defining 
procedures that assign artistic status – and a historically determined world inhabited by 
artistic and aesthetic theories that train the eye to watch contemporary productions: a 
social institution and a cultural atmosphere – a rule and its meaning, container and 
contents, syntax and semantic.  
 
Yanal‟s (1998) account describes the context as a set of practices and intentions rooted 
in a social and cultural domain. He is right, yet the definition seems too broad. The 
context is made of conventions (among which are artistic techniques, perceptive 
conventions &c....) and procedures for status attribution. Procedures define semantic 
domains – the “discourse of reasons” (Danto, 1992, p.46) for ontological attributions, 
the set of thoughts that drives the artist‟s or the insider‟s reflections – and syntactical 
structures – models of act that allow for status attributions4. Syntax and semantic are 
mutually inflected: syntactical structures ensure status attribution under proper reasons, 
while semantic domains rely on the issuing of syntactical structures – thereby 
neutralising Wollheim‟s claim (1984). Such procedures are enacted by qualified insiders 
that inhabit the framework.  
 
                                                     
3 I‟m here referring to The Artworld (1964) and Dickie‟s first proposal (1969) since the later developed 
account (1984, 2001) may posit some counter-arguments to Abrams conceptual construction.  
4 Dickie proposes one of these models in the first version of his theory. For something to be an artwork 
(y) an artifact (x) is required. X has to be presented by the artist to some people, acting on behalf of the 
social institution called “artworld”, so to become y. As an example, another model of act could be 
Binkley‟s account (1977): a simple indexation is required for something to be an artwork.   
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Institutional theories – or rather, contextual theories – insist on the relation 
between artworks and a status-validating framework, the “context”. So what does 
context specify? My proposal follows from Dickie’s (1969) and Danto’s (1964, 1992) 
suggestions3 and recalls Carroll’s (1994) narrative theory and Levinson’s (1979) 
historical oriented account. The context comprises a sociological dimension – 
defining procedures that assign artistic status – and a historically determined world 
inhabited by artistic and aesthetic theories that train the eye to watch contemporary 
productions: a social institution and a cultural atmosphere – a rule and its meaning, 
container and contents, syntax and semantic. 
Yanal’s (1998) account describes the context as a set of practices and intentions 
rooted in a social and cultural domain. He is right, yet the definition seems too broad. 
The context is made of conventions (among which are artistic techniques, perceptive 
conventions &c....) and procedures for status attribution. Procedures define 
semantic domains – the “discourse of reasons” (Danto, 1992, p.46) for ontological 
attributions, the set of thoughts that drives the artist’s or the insider’s reflections – 
and syntactical structures – models of act that allow for status attributions4. Syntax 
and semantic are mutually inflected: syntactical structures ensure status attribution 
under proper reasons, while semantic domains rely on the issuing of syntactical 
structures – thereby neutralising Wollheim’s claim (1984). Such procedures are 
enacted by qualified insiders that inhabit the framework. 
Facing anomalies 
Abrams’ paradigm accommodates almost every theoretical account explaining art 
phenomena – including the revolutionary instances of the ’60s, with just a minor 
change. Yet, art practice is showing essential transformations which the paradigm 
does not account for. Three main changes attract my attention, suggesting theoretical 
issues that can eventually break Abrams’s quite perfect construction.
Artworks – as outputs of an accurate artistic research – become ephemeral 
entities which modify their very ontological structure. E-flux was founded by Anton 
Vidokle and Julieta Aranda, when they organized The Best Surprise is No Surprise 
(1998), an exhibition at a Holiday Inn in San Francisco. At that time, Vidokle had just 
opened his first email account and he decided to send some exhibition invitations to 
his friends. The opening was outstanding. They had a right intuition: internet could 
spread invitations all around the world and, at the same time, become an archive 
of past events. This is e-flux, both a service for art institutions and a comprehensive 
collection of press releases and today, also a publishing company. Nobody argues 
that e-flux is an artwork, yet some claim its artistic status (Foster et al., 2004). It 
recalls conceptualism – the idea that artworks are a particular piece of reflexive 
information, that artworks are nothing but comments on art, as Kosuth posits 
(1968). It insists on conditions of art production – the art project produces its own 
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existence conditions. As Vidokle posits “I would say that e-flux is […] closer to a long-
term artists’ project” (Obrist et al., 2007, p.18). 
Artworks become projects – a terminological transformation that records an 
ontological modification. The project, as Claire Bishop (2012) argues, recalls an 
open process that alters with a participative collaboration, as opposed to artworks 
as finite objects. An anomaly in the paradigm therefore appears: a decentralisation 
of artworks encompasses a fluid temporality and the space of production is virtually 
unlimited. Equally, the project points out the underlying ongoing artistic research, 
as though artworks were leftovers of a comprehensive research. The project reflects 
a defined netjuhy of knowledge, roles, actors and skills. Again, “our attention is 
[…] shifted away from the production of a work (including a work of art) onto life 
in the art project – a life that is not primarily a productive process” (Groys, 2010, 
p.78). Groys underlies biopolitical urgencies, arguing that art is becoming a life-
managing technique. Nevertheless, both Groys and Bishop manifest attitudes that 
are redefining artworld behaviors following Boltanski’s and Chiapello’s (1999) notes 
on the relation between connective capitalism and art as project. 
David Hammons: The Unauthorized Retrospective (2006) is an exhibition curated 
by the curatorial collective ‘Triple Candie’. It includes color as well as black and 
white copies of Hammons’ artworks taken from existing reproductions in exhibition 
catalogues or websites. No artworks are in the show. Peter Nesbett and Shally 
Bancroft founded the curatorial collective in 2001, although they unveiled a new 
type of exhibition-making in 2006: artless exhibitions. Their activity focuses on the 
power that interference institutions are responsible for and it displays the process 
of ascribing value to an artist’s work. Their political attitude follows Agamben’s 
(2007) call to arms: profaning the unprofanable is the political task of the coming 
generation. They show how art discourse is independent from materialisation or 
dematerialisation of artworks, revealing the autonomy of curators’ activities. 
Curators have been equated with artists. Wilde (1891) predicted something 
similar when he highlighted an increasing predominance of discourse in art 
production before the 20th century avant-gardes’ and Wolfe’s (1975) suggestion 
that “these days, without a theory to go with it, I can’t see a painting” (p.2). As 
Wilde argues, the critic – or rather the curator – as artist specifies the autonomy of 
curator in producing legitimising reasons for seeing something as art. Contemporary 
art – as Senaldi (2012) and Dal Lago and Giordano (2006), to name a few, stated – is 
intrinsically related with the discourse on itself. So, if – thanks to such a discourse – 
one can recognise artistic value in objects and actions and the curator is the author 
of the discourse, then the curator is a demiurge. The curator endorses artists’ 
productions since he provides semantic reasons using specific types of syntactic 
structures, conferring peculiar ontological status upon them. Indeed, curators have 
a creative role. As Becker (1974) argues, artistic production is a collective activity, 
since a great part is played by the creation of artistic value (see also Balzer, 2015). In 
Bourdieu’s (1993) words, “the production of discourse about the work of art is one 
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of the conditions of production of the work” (p.35). There has been a fundamental 
change: curators do not only take care of artworks, they collaborate in the creation 
and their discourse has a performative power. 
Ultimately, such changes reveal a progressive autonomy of curators’ activity 
from past duties. Curators, independent and charismatic figures (see Richter, 2013), 
are anomalies: their performative activity is not accounted for in Abrams’ scheme. 
A theoretical reflection on exhibition-making is required since exhibitions express 
autonomous researches rather than display discrete artworks. In other words, 
artistic practices are expressed in various forms; artworks are one choice among 
others. 
Market, as a key actor, suggests another anomaly in Abrams’ paradigm functioning. 
Artist Lee Lozano used to say that action was in the extreme. Her performative 
pieces – dipped in minimalist and conceptualist commitments – coincided with 
self-sacrifice: General Strike Piece (1969) signs her dismissal from artworld – she 
rejected an invitation for a solo curated by Dick Bellamy – and from New York life in 
general. Her career was built on denials, however her recent rediscovery shows that 
nothing sells more than denials: “Lozano’s rediscovery by the artworld, as much as 
her withdrawal from it, belongs to a larger market dynamic” (Siegel, 2008, p. 391). 
The story is simple: gallerist Mitchell Algus in 1998 organises a Lozano solo after 
several decades. Here, critic Bob Nickas meets her work and proposes a drawings 
exhibition at MoMA P.S.1 in January 2004. Such moves would probably have gone 
unnoticed had Hauser & Wirth, one of world’s leading art galleries, not acquired 
Lozano’s estate. As Siegel (2008) argues, “press hardly matters if not accompanied 
by the right gallery context” (330). 
Lozano’s rediscovery is one among many other stories. It shows the power of 
market in shaping art history and attributing artistic value. As Bourdieu (1993) 
argues, alongside the pursuit of ‘economic’ profit […] there is also room for the 
accumulation of symbolic capital” (p.75). Symbolic capital determines economic 
value and vice versa, at the point that “success in market terms justifies and validates 
anything, replacing all the theories” (Houellebecq, 2011, p.219; see also Ullrich, 
2009). Art value is an extrinsic property (see Varzi, 2008): it requires for its existence 
the presence of observers. In other words, the circle of belief (Bourdieu, 1993) – 
those who recognise an artist’s value or create it – warrants such value, sustaining 
artworld’s productions by construing a shared belief in the distinctness of art objects 
and in the legitimising discourse held by artworld’s members. Value rests on the 
ongoing artistic research (while the artwork is merely a leftover), on the ability to 
create relationships and maintain a constant presence in artworld rituals. As stated 
by Steyerl (2016) “contemporary economy of art relies more on presence than on 
traditional ideas of labour power tied to the production of objects”.  Moreover, “the 
art sells the artist, and its price is directly connected to the added value associated 
with the artist’s media profile” (Davies & Ford, 1998, p.3). Such dynamics reinforce 
the decentralisation of artworks thus refocusing artworld’s primary urgencies. Again, 
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here, Abram’s paradigm is ineffective. Its semantic boundaries exclude market as an 
object of theoretical interest – maybe following the Cartesian distinction or resting 
of Christian separation between spiritual and material. Yet, market is a main actor in 
the system and its presence is influencing art history. 
Conclusions
These three examples should provide ideas for further research. Primarily, it seems 
that Abram’s paradigm must be abandoned since the two dogmas are irreconcilable: 
artworlds’ recent events checkmate their validity. The centrality of artworks – both 
in theoretical research and artists’ productions – is denied in many ways. Artists’ 
concerns turn away from the production of objects; curators care more about 
their own artistic research while art market rests on new kind of economies – 
reputational economy, cognitive economy and economy of presence. The primacy 
of a biunivocal relation, on the other hand, does not account for the complexity 
of artworld dynamics, while only an inflected and circular reflection accounts for a 
circular social phenomenon. I hope my analysis has highlighted this. 
A new paradigm might be proposed. The artwork should be understood merely 
as one of artworld’s output – not the most important one. Decentralised artworks 
allow for a deeper reflection on artworld’s dynamics and an understanding of the 
nature of its internal relations, actors and ways of attributing values. Moreover, 
a theoretical analysis of the market’s procedures and its power is required for an 
appropriate understanding of art phenomena; yet, insiders ask for theoretical tools 
beyond preconceptions.
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